Forty years ago Jürgen Moltmann published The Crucified God, which set the cat among a few theological pigeons. In the face of the history of suffering in the world, Moltmann argued that we must speak of God 'within earshot of the dying Jesus'. In the process he argues against the understanding of God, the immanent Trinity, as impassible. Having been sympathetic to Moltmann's view, the author now raises some questions against it. Apart from the lack of a clear agreed meaning of impassibility (apatheia), the protagonists on each side of the question disagree fundamentally on the meaning of God's transcendence and the abundance of God's eternal 'life'.
Introduction
I remember well my first reaction to the publication of Jürgen Moltmann's The Crucified God.
1 It is one thing to speak of the crucified Christ, but the claim of a crucified God seemed quite preposterous. Reading it stretched my then quite narrow theological horizons further than almost every other theological book I have read since. From the first chapter on identity and relevance in Christian faith and life to the final chapter on a hermeneutics of liberation based on a theology of the cross, I was fascinated by an understanding of the cross not governed by some version of the theory of the atonement. In particular, the sixth chapter, "The 'Crucified God'", the hinge on which everything in the book turns, captured my imagination, and it has never ceased to engage me, though in recent years also to concern me. Most students to whom I have taught classes on Moltmann's theology have found it as rewarding a text to study as I found it satisfying to introduce it.
3 grimace of absurdity and nothingness." 7 Moltmann is passionate about articulating a better theodicy than the standard one that promised a reward "above the starry sky". His Crucified God is above all an answer to the "protest atheism" powerfully articulated in Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov and echoed silently by millions after him. 8 These points made by Bauckham could very easily be taken further, for all three of them go to the very nature of God's being. Two points should be made immediately about this: about the triune identity of the God of Christian revelation and about the need to be aware of the danger of idolatry.
First, the doctrine of the Trinity, more than anything else, sets the Christian faith apart from other religions, not only today but from the beginning. Moltmann's answer to his two questions about the doctrine of the Trinity-whether the 'human', the 'crucified' God can be understood without it and, conversely, whether we can think of God trinitarianly without the event of the cross 9 -is a firm negative. The only way to avoid reducing this doctrine to abstract speculation, in Moltmann's view, is to make the theologia salvifica the starting point of trinitarian thinking; 10 in other words, to begin with the incarnation and the cross, rather than with any kind of natural theology. Moltmann delights in the discovery of a book written before he was born, B. Steffen's Das Dogma vom Kreuz: Beitrag zu einer staurozentrischen Theologie (The Dogma of the Cross: A Contribution to a Staurocentric Theology), whose author wrote these remarkable words:
The scriptural basis for Christian belief in the triune God is not the scanty trinitarian formulas of the New Testament, but the thoroughgoing, unitary testimony of the cross; and the shortest expression of the Trinity is the divine act of the cross, in which the Father allows the Son to sacrifice himself through the Spirit.
11
For Moltmann, the theological meaning of the cross cannot be expressed unless both the Father and the Son are subjects: the will of the Father and the will of the Son are distinct, though they are completely at one in the Son's going to the cross.
12
7 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 219. 8 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 219-227. 9 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 236. 10 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 239. 11 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 241. 12 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 243. To be convincingly trinitarian, of course, greater attention needs to be given to the place of the Spirit in the event of the cross than Moltmann does in this early work. There he says little more than that the Spirit "proceeds from this event between Father and Son". It is the Spirit who then "justifies the godless, fills the forsaken with love and even brings the dead alive …" (244) the atheistic answer to the question posed by the history of suffering, of which the cry of Godforsakenness from the cross is, theologically speaking, the sharpest form. 20 At issue, then, is the serious question of how to speak faithfully of God and avoid falling into idolatry. For Moltmann, it seems, we are most prone to this when we gloss over the problem of the history of suffering in the world, for which all traditional answers, theistic and atheistic, are highly unsatisfactory. This is why he insists on trying to understand the being of God from the death of Jesus. One good consequence of the 'death of God' theology of the 1960s is that it forced theologians to develop a theology "within earshot of the dying Jesus." 21 However difficult, the death of Jesus has to be in some way a statement about God. In a long passage from Rahner, Moltmann
shows that Rahner goes a long way toward this: "If it is said that that the incarnate Logos died only in his human reality, and if this is tacitly understood to mean that this death therefore did not affect God, only half the truth has been stated." 22 Later in the same passage Rahner writes, "Jesus' death belongs to God's self-utterance." Küng and Jüngel venture into the same controversial territory. If we are to adhere to the traditional divine perfection of impassibility, it will have to be in a softer, less rigidly philosophical sense of 'impassible'. 23 We shall return to this in due course. Suffice it here to say that if the being of God is to be discussed "within earshot of the dying Jesus", the divine attribute of impassibility will, to a greater or lesser extent, come under challenge.
More than three decades after the publication of The Crucified God Moltmann published his autobiography, in which inter alia he reflects on his major published works. In the chapter devoted to The Crucified God Moltmann makes it clear that he was "wrestling with God" on the interface of human suffering-his own and others' in Hamburg in 1943 as well as that of "the victims of injustice and violence in human history"-and the theology of the cross, in particular the meaning of Jesus" suffering. 24 Belonging to the generation which was contemporary with Auschwitz, What we dare to say about God "after Auschwitz" surely depends on what we can say about God after the event on Golgotha, and the way we talk about God when we hear the echo of Christ's death cry: "My God, why have you forsaken me?" The whole book can be understood as an attempt to wrestle theologically with that death cry.
25
Moltmann finds confirmation of his theology of the cross in some medieval images of the Trinity.
26
In one version of this iconographic tradition in the Western Church, the Father holds the cross-beam of the cross with Christ on it, and the Spirit between the Father and the Son; this is sometimes known as the "Throne of Mercy" Trinity or the "Mercy-seat" Trinity. Another version of it is a counterpart to the Pietà: the deeply moved Father holds the dead Son in his arms, with the Spirit again close to both the Father and the Son.
27
In summary, in the tradition of Luther, thus in the most radical sense possible, Moltmann argues the case for understanding God's being from the cross. Moltmann acknowledges that there is much in the book that is "harshly formulated and overstated" and that this book, though more often translated than any of his other books, has aroused controversy. 30 Carl Braaten found much to approve in the book and welcomed the turn back to the theology of the cross. "But", he added, "it will scarcely do to spin the whole of theology out of a single principle, no matter which one or how important. God cannot be described as having the feelings or passions which belong to human persons and interactions. In short, God does not have emotions like ours or of which our emotions might be considered to be analogies.
This list of motives for asserting divine impassibility is followed by a further set of three motives for challenging the belief that God is impassible. 36 The first concerns the nature of love and the basic Christian belief that God is love (1 Jn 4:16). If God loves the world, as the Fourth Gospel declares in no uncertain terms (Jn 3:16), it is unthinkable that God does not experience some kind of suffering or other 'feelings', when confronted with the evil and injustice that characterize life in the world. Second, if God is not only transcendent in relation to this world but also immanent in relation to it, it is thought unlikely that God does not in some sense suffer with those who suffer. If
God is, so to speak, closer to us than we are to ourselves, does God not participate in that suffering to some degree or in some way, even taking into account the ontological difference between God and finite creatures? Third, the cross must express something that is true of the very being, the 'heart', of God. The New Testament declares that God was moved to send the Son into the world to live our life and die our death. This sending, whether in a Pauline or Johannine framework, is suggestive of a God with a loving heart. The language is, of course, unavoidably anthropomorphic or anthropopathic.
To move beyond this juxtaposition of opposing ways of thinking about God as impassible or passible, both of which have some support in biblical texts, it is necessary to consider how the philo- from Hellenistic philosophy, and that the philosophical eventually became predominant. This tradition of philosophy, though by no means uniform, understood God (or the divine) as "unconditioned by creation in his simplicity, perfection, non-mutability, timeless eternity, omnipotence, impassibility, and so on." 37 The opposition between these ways of thinking should not be overstated, since Jewish thought was already influenced by hellenistic thought-forms. Philo of Alexandria is a case in point, though it is simplistic to regard his interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures, especially its anthropomorphism, as simply the result of importing hellenistic categories of thought. His critical view of the anthropomorphism of the Hebrew Scriptures owes just as much to his understanding of the biblical vision of God. 38 Pannenberg offers a judicious assessment of the relation of biblical and hellenistic ideas in the early Christian writers. Far from regarding the use of hellenistic categories of thought as a corruption of early Christian theology, he sees the relation between the two ways of thinking in much more positive terms. 39 The motivation for bringing together the biblical idea of God with the philosophical concept of God came as much from biblical thinking about the one God, the creator of all things, as it did from within the middle Platonism that shaped the intellectual culture of the early centuries of Christianity. In Pannenberg's view, Jewish monotheism and hellenistic philosophical monotheism were natural allies. 40 Christian theology was selective in its borrowing: what was received had to be transformed on the basis of the biblical idea of God, in which God was not simply the author of everything that exists but was also free to make history, as in the election of a Covenant people. 41 The Apologists appropriated the philosophical accentuation of God's otherness, transcendence and incomprehensibility, ideas which were benign to the Christian understanding of God. In the matter of divine immutability and impassibility the results were more ambiguous. Some of the Apologists accepted the idea of God's immutability as an extension of God's being unoriginate and indestructible. However, the idea is foreign to the biblical writers and, in Pannenberg's judgment, it is "inappropriate if applied to them without qualification." 42 It may reinforce the idea of God's indestructibility and stability, but this does not say enough. It is also misleading: God is not immobile but has within Godself "an infinite plenitude of ever new possibilities in the realization of which he manifests the freedom of his invisible essence." 43 The divine stability is not a matter of "an immobility constitutive of God's essence but rather of his free, momentary … decision." 44 To use biblical language, it is a matter of God's faithfulness. Pannenberg regards the idea of a God who is by nature immutable to have been seriously obstructive to the idea of God's historical action. The destructive implications of this are even clearer in the parallel idea of God's impassibility, which created serious problems in articulating the doctrine of the incarnation.
The adoption of hellenistic concepts was as much a help as a hindrance to a theology which, of course, was bound to be biblical. It is certainly a distortion to regard it as an unmitigated disaster, as is sometimes claimed. The picture is in any case much less uniform than is typically thought.
Gavrilyuk describes it in terms of a "complex web of theological views", which left the Christian Fathers with anything but "a clear-cut choice between the involved God of the Bible and the uninvolved God of the Hellenistic philosophers". 45 To put it this way is misleading. The philosophers were not all in agreement on these matters, so it can hardly have been the case that the theologians simply agreed with, and adopted the views of, the philosophers. to abandon a key attribute of deity as defined by the philosophical tradition, and to review the old between the divine and human natures of Christ. 53 By declaring that the divine nature has a conceptual relation, not a real relation, to the human nature -the human nature having a real relation to the divine nature -it was assumed to be clear that the divine nature could remain unchanged in the incarnation and therefore the cry of God-forsakenness on the cross could be predicated of the human nature alone. 54 The trinitarian language of the relationship between the Father and the Son takes us much further into the death of Jesus and its theological meaning, in particular its meaning for God (the Father), as distinct from its salvific meaning.
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The only sense in which Moltmann could accept the immutability of God is a very qualified one.
God is "not changeable as creatures are changeable", not under constraint from that which is not The Christian conviction that God loves the world and that God is love requires something more than what this philosophical tradition could provide. In the light of the incarnation, the Christian understanding of God could never be satisfied with giving an account only of the divine ousia; in due course it had to speak also of the relationships with divine Persons who are intimately interrelated. Surprisingly, the love of God-the mutual love of the trinitarian Persons and the love of God for the created world-was not thought to put the divine apatheia in question. But the concept of apatheia underwent change and expansion, as Moltmann notes, though with little detail. 62 The doctrine of the Trinity, notably the economic Trinity, put the idea of divine apatheia into a different framework. Moltmann acknowledges that these changes need to be noted "if justice is to be done to the apathetic theology of antiquity and its acceptance in Judaism and Christianity." God the Son suffers all the contingencies and evils recorded in the Gospels, and concludes them by suffering execution. God the Father raises him from the dead; nor do we have reason to think of this act as dispassionately done. So and not otherwise the Father triumphs over suffering. God the Spirit is the sphere of the triumph. And 'triumph' is the precise word: the Father and the Spirit take the suffering of the creature who the Son is into the triune life and bring from it the final good of that creature, all other creatures, and of God. So and not otherwise the true God transcends suffering … 69 Moltmann directly, not always in moderate terms. David Bentley Hart is scathing in his criticism.
He is concerned that even the foremost theologians of the theology of the West, especially Protestants, have taken Rahner's maxim that "the 'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent Trinity and the 'immanent' Trinity is the 'economic' Trinity" 70 too far, leading to a confusion of the two concepts or the abolition of any distinction between them at all. 71 He is critical in general of neo-Hegelians, among whom he names Moltmann, Jüngel, Pannenberg and Jenson, noting that there are differences between them. Moltmann receives the sharpest rebuke for his "loose, rhapsodic, paraenetic expostulations", a criticism which is exaggerated and unfair; 72 only Jüngel is accused of being more incoherent. Of the introduction of history into the being of God Hart takes a dim view: "we flirt here with calamity." On the immediate point, he laments that God's impassibility "may well prove to be a piece of conceptual furniture for which fewer and fewer theologians can find or remember a proper use." 73 In general, criticism of the trend towards affirming God's passibility can be summarised in five points.
First, a major criticism levelled against Moltmann, as well as others, is that insufficient account is taken of God's transcendence. Reference was made above to Sokolowski's strong assertion of the ontological difference between divine and creaturely being. 74 God's transcendence in relation to everything that is created needs to be understood in radical terms. God and the universe should never be confused or identified in their essential being, which is not to say that they should not be understood in relation to each other. God is not an 'entity which may be considered in relation to other things in the universe but a different reality in every possible respect. Even the word 'being' is problematic: to claim that God has being is to imply that God is an instance of the species 'beings'.
God's transcendence is more radical; the relation between God and all created reality is utterly asymmetrical. Kathryn Tanner distinguishes between contrastive and non-contrastive accounts of suffering is solely for the benefit of those who suffer; it has in it no element at all of self-concern.
Unlike human love, God's love is "immutably and impassibly adapted to every situation and circumstance, not because [it] is indifferent and unresponsive, but because his love, with all its facets, is fully in act, and so he is supremely and utterly responsive to every situation and circumstance." 84 The cogency of this third argument increases in proportion to the emphasis given to God's transcendence.
A fourth criticism of the passibilist view is that its understanding of God's apatheia is flawed. It is argued by several defenders of God's impassibility that apatheia never mean detachment and indifference. Daniel Castelo writes, … when ancient writers spoke of God's apatheia in glowing and favourable terms, they did not envisage a detached and unapproachable God. On the contrary, for many writers and thinkers, God's apatheia suggested the opposite: that God was so distinct from and transcendent to the world's occurrences that his presence and actions could carry meaning and significance. The assumption that God was beyond the ever-fluctuating circumstances of a hurting and dying world actually brought hope to believers. 85 The Latin term 'impassibility' is typically understood as 'passionless', as implying something This would mean understanding God as "the God who is wholly other, in whom being and becoming, remaining in himself and going out from himself, transcendence and descendence, are not mutually exclusive." 96 Pannenberg's statement above-that God is absolute in his relation to the world and not restricted by it, but fulfilled himself through that relationship-is similarly paradoxical. Little sense can be made of such statements without observing the distinction between God as immanent Trinity and God as economic Trinity. As Pannenberg suggests, the unity of the economic and the immanent Trinity cannot be 'located' anywhere in time but only 'in the eschatological consummation of history.' 97 Only in this perspective can the paradox be resolved and both being and becoming be predicated of the eternal God.
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that Moltmann's book, The Crucified God, had an enormous impact on the theological scene, not confined to Western Europe nor to the period immediately following its publication. Many will testify that this provocative work opened the way to a new understanding of God as compassionate and involved in the struggles and sufferings of the world. For others it has been a problematic and troubling book, violating the quasi-sacred theological tradition of divine immutability and impassibility. The question whether the eternal God is impassible or passible is genuinely difficult, quite apart from the troublesome elasticity of the basic terms in the discussion. 95 Pannenberg, "The God of History," 35. 96 Küng, The Incarnation of God, 533. 
